What Commonwealth v. Piard Teaches Us About Police Interrogation, Confession Law, and the Limits of Appeals in Massachusetts
In Commonwealth v. Joseph Piard, 23-P-846, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the rape conviction of a Boston rideshare driver, rejecting several appellate claims focused on the admissibility of his incriminating statements. The opinion—decided on April 18, 2025—centers on whether the defendant clearly invoked his right to remain silent during police interrogation, and whether the trial court erred in admitting his videotaped confession.
The majority concluded that the claim had been waived because Piard’s trial counsel failed to raise the issue in a motion to suppress. The court held that any challenge based on invocation of the right to remain silent must instead be brought in a motion for new trial under the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel. But the dissent, in a lengthy and forceful opinion, argued that Piard's rights had been violated in real time—and that the appellate court should not require a second round of litigation before acknowledging that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.
This case offers critical lessons for Massachusetts criminal defense lawyers, especially those handling sex crimes, motions to suppress, and cases hinging on the voluntariness of a confession.
The Allegations: A Rideshare Ride Turned Criminal Investigation
In July 2019, a 20-year-old college student used a rideshare app after a night of heavy drinking in Boston’s Fenway neighborhood. She was extremely intoxicated—slurring her speech, stumbling, and barely able to keep her eyes open. A friend helped her into the backseat of Joseph Piard’s Mitsubishi Mirage around 1:45 AM. Due to an error in the app, the driver initially dropped her off at the wrong address. She reentered the car, passed out again, and never made it home that night.
At 2:06 AM, after dropping off other passengers, Piard flagged down a Harvard police officer and commented that he had “a really drunk girl” in his car. The officer advised him to take her home. But instead of driving her to her residence, Piard allowed her to remain unconscious in his car for over five hours. When the woman awoke around 7:00 AM, still intoxicated, she was in the front passenger seat. Piard said she had been asleep all night and demanded $30 for her extended presence in the vehicle.
She paid him, but felt uneasy, especially after realizing Piard had somehow accessed her personal phone number—despite app-based safeguards meant to prevent that. She asked, via text, “What happened last night?” Piard assured her nothing had happened. But a later sexual assault exam revealed sperm cells in her vagina. Testing matched the DNA to Piard.
The Interrogation: Consent, DNA, and a Contested Confession
Piard voluntarily met with Boston police twice before his arrest—first on August 11, 2019, and later by phone on September 9 after he was informed that sperm had been found in the victim’s vaginal swab. He denied sexual contact during those early conversations. But on September 24, during a post-arrest interview, everything changed.
In that audio-video recorded interview, Detective Goff told Piard that police had “incontrovertible scientific proof” that his sperm was inside the victim’s vagina. Piard repeatedly asked to see the DNA report. At one point, he said, “I can’t answer any other questions if I don’t have any proof that my, my cells were inside of her vagina.” Police continued questioning him anyway.
Eventually, Piard admitted that he had inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina while she was “sort of asleep.” He said she didn’t want him to, and that he ejaculated outside the car. He later claimed the sex was consensual and that he had confessed only because he felt panicked and coerced.
The Legal Challenge: Motion to Suppress and Procedural Waiver
Before trial, Piard’s counsel filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his statements were involuntary. But counsel did not argue that Piard had invoked his right to remain silent or that police violated Miranda by continuing to question him after he attempted to stop the interview.
This omission proved fatal to the appeal. Under Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 13(a)(2), suppression arguments not raised before trial are deemed waived. The Appeals Court enforced that rule strictly. Although the defense raised the invocation issue for the first time on appeal, the court refused to consider it, emphasizing that the claim should be pursued—if at all—via a motion for new trial.
The court held that assessing whether Piard’s statement (“I can’t answer any other questions…”) amounted to an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent required factual development. Did the officer hear him? Was the tone ambiguous? These are questions, the majority concluded, that must first be answered by the trial court—not the appellate bench.
The Dissent: When Silence Should Speak Volumes
Justice Smyth dissented in full, arguing that the court should have reviewed the claim for a “substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice,” despite the procedural waiver. He pointed to the fact that the interrogation was fully recorded, that the defendant’s alleged invocation was audible and unmistakable, and that the Commonwealth raised no prejudice from the lack of pretrial notice.
In his view, when Piard said, “I can’t answer any other questions,” he was clearly invoking his constitutional right to remain silent. Police were constitutionally obligated to stop the interrogation at that moment. They did not. Instead, they pressed forward, dismissed his request, and used a “now or never” tactic to elicit a confession.
Smyth also emphasized that the confession was the cornerstone of the Commonwealth’s case. Without it, the evidence was largely circumstantial. He would have vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial.
Why This Case Matters
The Piard decision is more than a disturbing case of sexual assault. It’s a procedural roadmap with serious implications for defense lawyers in Massachusetts. Here are a few takeaways:
1. Raise Every Viable Suppression Ground in Pretrial Motions.
If a defendant arguably invoked Miranda rights—however ambiguously—raise it early. If you wait until appeal, it may be too late. The court’s strict enforcement of Rule 13(a)(2) can foreclose meaningful review.
2. Voluntariness and Invocation Are Distinct Doctrines.
In Piard, the defense challenged voluntariness but not invocation. As a result, the appellate court refused to consider whether Piard's statement, “I can’t answer any other questions,” constituted an invocation of the right to silence. These are legally separate issues—and both must be preserved.
3. Motions for New Trial May Be the Only Path.
The majority repeatedly emphasized that Piard may still pursue relief through a motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance. But that's a burdensome, uncertain process—especially when suppression arguments could have been litigated pretrial.
4. Recorded Interrogations Are a Double-Edged Sword.
Video evidence can protect a defendant—but it also provides the prosecution with ammunition. Defense counsel must analyze these recordings carefully for any sign of coercion, misrepresentation, or invocation, and frame their suppression theories accordingly.
Final Thoughts: The Line Between Justice and Procedure
There’s no question that the facts of this case are troubling. The DNA evidence was damning. But even the strongest evidence cannot justify violating a defendant’s constitutional rights. The heart of Piard is not just what happened in the car—it’s what happened in the interrogation room.
Did Piard invoke his right to remain silent? Was his confession the product of coercive tactics? And if so, should procedural default bar the courts from intervening?
The Appeals Court said yes—at least for now. But Piard is a case to watch. If a new trial motion is filed and granted, the appellate court may be forced to revisit the question it declined to answer. For defense lawyers across Massachusetts, Piard is a reminder to fight suppression battles early, frame issues comprehensively, and preserve every constitutional claim before it’s too late.
Need Help With a Suppression Motion or Criminal Appeal in Massachusetts?
Our team at Benzaken, Maguire, Sheehan & Wood, LLP has decades of experience challenging unconstitutional confessions and protecting the rights of defendants at every stage of the process. If you or a loved one is facing serious charges, don’t wait—contact a Massachusetts criminal defense attorney who knows how to fight, file, and win.